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Abstract
Legislative acts or constitutional courts’ decisions allowing the prosecution of alleged perpe-
trators of international crimes committed in the past continue to attribute to the legality prin-
ciple a central role within domestic criminal proceedings or complaints before the European 
Court of Human Rights. This article assesses the evolution of the recent jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court, which in the 2008 Korbely and Kononov cases for the first time extended the 
standards of the legality principle over war crimes and crimes against humanity. It examines 
the rationale for this development, which constitutes an attempt by the Court to restore a 
proper balance between substantive justice and individual protection, by ascertaining whether 
domestic convictions were consistent with the qualitative elements of the legality principle, 
such as accessibility and foreseeability. Through a detailed analysis of the European jurispru-
dence, the article argues that, although the new approach of the Court entails in abstracto a 
strengthening of individual safeguards from the arbitrariness of state power, the meaningful 
protection of the legality principle may be in concreto significantly narrow. The reasons for such 
a result are two-pronged: first, the Court seems to provide an interpretation of past law which 
radically diverged from the interpretation of the law in place in the legal system at the material 
time of the events; second, the international sources accepted by the Court as a valid basis for 
the applicants’ convictions – pursuant to the standards of the legality principle – were intended 
to create obligations only upon states, rather than individuals.
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1. Introduction
On 9 April 2003, Estonian courts convicted Mr. Penart of crimes against humanity 
committed in 1953. A few months later, on 10 October 2003, Mr. Kolk and Mr. 
Kislyiy were found responsible for the same crimes that took place in 1949. All of 
them submitted complaints against Estonia before the European Court of Human 
*) The author wishes to express his gratitude and appreciation to Professor Stefano Manacorda 
and Dr. Peter Langford for this comments on an earlier draft.
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Rights (the Court), claiming that their convictions, following a law enacted on 9 
November 1994, breached the prohibition of retrospective application of criminal 
law pursuant to Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention).1
Likewise, on 27 August 2004, Mr. Kononov addressed the Court holding that his 
conviction for war crimes which occurred in 1944 was a violation of the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle.2 The applicant had been convicted by Latvian courts on 
the basis of a definition of war crimes provided by a law issued on 6 April 1993.
On 20 January 2002, Mr. Korbely lodged an application to the Court against the 
Republic of Hungary alleging that he had been convicted of an action which did 
not constitute a crime at the time of commission.3 On 16 February 1993, the 
Hungarian Parliament passed a law (the Act) permitting the prosecution of those 
who had committed crimes during the 1956 uprisings.4 The conformity of the Act 
with the Constitution was confirmed, a few months later, by the Constitutional 
Court, with regard to crimes against humanity and war crimes.5 On 8 November 
2001, Mr. Korbely was found responsible for crimes against humanity on the basis 
of Article 3(1) of the (IV) 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War.
These different cases place into question the legality principle, a cornerstone of 
every criminal justice system based on the rule of law, and a bulwark against the 
arbitrary exercise of jus puniendi by states or the international community.6 
Indeed, an individual may be prosecuted, sentenced or convicted only if his act or 
omission and the form of punishment are defined by law, as enshrined in the Latin 
maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. In pursuance of this principle, every 
individual has the right to know which acts are defined criminal, and predict with 
certainty the legal consequences deriving from their commission.7 Therefore, 
clear and specific criminal norms have a threefold purpose: providing legal 
1) See Penart v. Estonia, 24 January 2006, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) no. 14685/04, 
< http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html& 
highlight=penart&sessiod=98798553&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 15 April 2012; Kolk and 
Kislyiy v. Estonia, 17 January 2006, ECHR no. 23052/04 and no. 24018/04, <http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=kolk&sessionid 
=98798553&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 15 April 2012.
2) See Kononov v. Latvia (Kononov no. 2), 17 May 2010, ECHR no. 36376/04, <http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Kononov&sessionid
=98798553&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 19 March 2012.
3) See Korbely v. Hungary, 19 September 2008, ECHR no. 9174/02, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=korbely&sessionid=98798553
&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 20 March 2012.
4) Ibid., para. 16.
5) See Hungary, Constitutional Court, Decision no. 53/1993, On War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity, 13 October 1993.
6) See G. Fiandaca and E. Musco, Diritto penale parte generale (Zanichelli, 2009) p. 47 ff.
7) Ibid.
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certainty, constraining states’ power, and deterring individuals from engaging in 
socially undesirable conducts.8
This article aims to address one of the most debated issues in international 
criminal law concerning the uneasiness in balancing individual safeguards – pro-
tecting every person from arbitrary conviction and punishment – with the need to 
ensure substantive justice through the prosecution of acts regarded as abhorrent 
by all members of society, regardless of whether they were considered criminal at 
the time of commission. Although scholarship has already extensively addressed 
the problematic relationship between the legality principle and international 
crimes,9 the issue still remains particularly difficult at the national level. This 
ensures the topicality of the present article today.
It has been argued that, due to the increasing codification of international 
criminal law, the nullum crimen plea assumes less and less relevance before the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).10 Nonetheless, legislative acts or constitu-
tional courts’ decisions, allowing the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of inter-
national crimes committed in the past, continues to attribute the legality principle 
a central role within domestic criminal proceedings or complaints before the 
Court of Strasbourg. This is particularly true in relation to Eastern European coun-
tries, which, since the end of the Cold War, have showed a significant interest in 
prosecuting and punishing alleged perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity taking place under the regime in the Soviet Union.
For instance, it may be noted that Article 5(4) of the Latvian Criminal Code 
permits the retrospective application of crimes against humanity and war crimes.11 
Similarly, Article 5(4) of the Estonian Criminal Code removes such crimes from 
the scope of applicability of the nullum crimen sine lege, by establishing that 
8) Ibid.
  9) See inter alia G. Vassalli (ed.), Formula Di Radbruch E Diritto Penale. Note Sulla Punizione Dei 
‘delitti di Stato’ nella Germania PostNazista e nella Germnaia PostComunista (Giuffré, 2001); 
M. Caianiello and E. Fronza, ‘Il principio di Legalità nello Statuto della Corte Penale 
Internazionale’, in G. Carlizzi et al. (eds.), La Corte penale internazionale. Problemi e prospettive 
(Vivarium, Napoli, 2003); M. Shahabuddeen, ‘Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of 
Progressive Development of Law?’ 2:4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004); T. Meron, 
‘Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law’ 99:4 American Journal of International Law (2005) 
p. 817; M. Catenacci, Legalità e tipicità del reato nello Statuto della Corte Penale Internazionale 
(Giuffré, 2003); V. D. Degan, ‘On the Sources of International Criminal Law’, 4:1 Chinese Journal 
of International Law (2005); W. N. Ferdinandusse, Direct application of international criminal 
law in national courts (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2006) p. 221 et seq.; M. Delmas-Marty, 
E. Fronza and E. L. Abdelgawad, Les sources du droit international pénal (Société de législation 
comparée, Paris, 2005).
10) W. A. Schabas, ‘Synergy or Fragmentation?: International Criminal Law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, 9:3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2011) p. 615.
11) The law modifying the Criminal Code was adopted on 6 April 1996 and exempted from any 
statutory limitations pursuant to Article 45(1). See also Article 5(4) of the Latvian Criminal 
Code, providing that “[a] person, who has committed an offence against humanity, an offence 
against peace, a war crime or has participated in genocide, shall be punishable irrespective of 
the time when such offence was committed”.
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crimes against humanity and war crimes are punishable regardless of the time of 
commission of the offence.12 Similarly, both the Albanian and Polish Constitutions 
provide an exception for international crimes in their formulation of the legality 
principle in national law.13
In other domestic systems, the constitutional court has itself upheld the retro-
spective application of criminal norms without breaching the nulllum crimen sine 
lege. For instance, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, referring to Articles 15(2) 
and 7(2) of the Convention, held that criminal legislation incorporating legal 
norms on war crimes and crimes against humanity could be retroactively applied.14 
In the same manner, in Slovenia, the Constitutional Court affirmed that the prohi-
bition of retroactive effects of penal law does not apply for acts or omissions which 
at the time they were committed were considered criminal offences in accordance 
with the general legal principles recognised by all nations.15
Despite these domestic attempts to provide victims of the most serious crimes 
with justice, concerns stem from the possibility that individuals are tried and con-
victed for acts which did not constitute criminal offences at the time of their com-
mission. In this regard, a proper adherence to the standards of the legality principle 
requires the determination of whether the relevant act or omission would have 
given rise to criminal responsibility at the time of commission, and whether these 
individuals could effectively know that their acts were criminalised, and therefore 
could predict the criminal consequences.
This article aims, therefore, to further the discussion by analysing the European 
Court’s approach to the relationship between the legality principle and interna-
tional crimes. Both paragraphs of Article 7 refer to international law: according to 
the first paragraph: “No one shall be guilty of any criminal offence on account of 
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed”;16 the second paragraph 
reads as follows: “This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any 
person or any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was 
12) See Article 5(4) of the Estonian Criminal Code, which states that “[o]ffences against human-
ity and war crimes shall be punishable regardless of the time of commission of the offence”.
13) Article 29 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania establishes that “[n]o one may be 
accused or declared guilty of a criminal offense that was not provided for by law at the time of 
its commission, with the exception of offenses, which at the time of their commission consti-
tuted war crimes or crimes against humanity according to international law”; according to 
Article 42(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, “[o]nly a person who has committed 
an act prohibited by a statute in force at the moment of commission thereof, and which is sub-
ject to a penalty, shall be held criminally responsible. This principle shall not prevent punish-
ment of any act which, at the moment of its commission, constituted an offence within the 
meaning of international law.”
14) See supra note 5.
15) See Slovenia, Constitutional Court, U-I-248/96, 30 September 1998 and Slovenia, Consti-
tutional Court, U-I-6/93, 13 January 1994.
16) See Article 7(1) of the Convention, emphasis added.
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criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the civilized 
nations.”17
Beyond the difficulty in setting out an exhaustive definition of international 
crimes or, at least, the essential criteria characterising conducts that constitute 
international crimes,18 the concept of ‘international law’ under Article 7(1) raises 
several problematical issues. First, it is subject to debate whether a domestic court 
can try or punish a behaviour criminalised only by international norms, not trans-
posed into domestic law, without breaching the principle of legality.
Second, neither the Convention nor the Court specifies which sources fall 
within the concept of international law pursuant to article 7(1). According to 
Bassiouni, this provision reflects Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, which includes customary law, conventions, and general princi-
ples of law.19 Nonetheless, general principles of law are explicitly mentioned in the 
second paragraph of Article 7 of the European Convention, whose purpose and 
scope is the object of an open-ended debate among scholars. It is thus necessary 
to commence by examining the relationship between the two parts of the provi-
sion in question.
Then, the article critically assesses the Court’s jurisprudence, which, until 2008, 
has systematically applied Article 7(2) to war crimes, acts of treason and collabo-
ration with the enemy, and crimes against humanity without clarifying the pur-
pose and content of the provision in question. In this respect, it is herein argued 
that the vague concept of the general principles of law recognised by the civilised 
nations has a significant impact on the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual.
In 2008, for the first time, the Court did not automatically apply the Article 7(2) 
derogation, and –departing from its previous case law – extended the applicability 
of the legality principle to war crimes and crimes against humanity.20 This article 
examines the rationale for this development, which constitutes an attempt by the 
Court to restore a proper balance between substantive justice and individual pro-
tection, by ascertaining whether domestic convictions were consistent with the 
qualitative elements of the legality principle, such as accessibility and foreseeabil-
ity. However, although the new approach of the Court aims to ensure the guaran-
tees enshrined in the legality principle, there still remain perplexities concerning 
the compatibility with the standards of the legality principle of international 
17) See article 7(2) of the Convention, emphasis added.
18) C. Damgaard (ed.), Individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes: selected 
pertinent issues (Springer, 2008).
19) See M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), Le fonti e il contenuto del diritto penale internazionale. Un Quadro 
teorico. (Milano, 1999) pp. 755.
20) See respectively Kononov v. Latvia (Kononov no. 1) 24 July 2008, ECHR no. 36376/04 <http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight 
= kononov&sessionid=98798553&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 10 February 2012; Korbely, supra 
note 3.
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sources not entailing any reference to criminal liability or criminal sanction but 
rather imposing obligations only upon states.
2. A Preliminary Issue: The Purpose of the ‘General Principles of Law’ in the 
Convention System of Protection
It is particularly difficult to argue that crimes against humanity and crimes 
against  peace were already punishable under international law at the time 
at which the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT) was estab-
lished.21 Although the defence counsels claimed that the prosecution for crimes 
against peace violated the legality principle, the judges rejected such arguments, 
holding that:
It is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sover-
eignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who 
in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighbouring states without warning 
is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing 
wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were 
allowed to go unpunished… [The Nazi leaders] must have known that they were acting in 
defiance of all international law when in complete deliberation they carried out their 
designs of invasion and aggression.22
As a mere principle of justice, rather than a binding rule, the judges could decide 
whether it would have been more just to leave acts committed by Nazi forces 
unpunished or punish them by relying on a retroactive application of criminal 
law.23 In balancing the legality principle with the need to prosecute perpetrators 
of heinous actions, the judges convicted Nazis also of conduct not proscribed 
and criminalised under national or international law at the time at which they 
were performed.24 In this way, the legality principle was intended to yield to 
superior reasons of justice intended to prevent Nazi perpetrators from being 
unpunished.25
In this context, in order to avoid affording Nazi criminals a claim of a violation 
of the nullum crimen sine lege before the Strasbourg Court, a second paragraph 
was inserted in Article 7 of the Convention (the so-called ‘Nuremberg clause’), 
21) See Schabas supra note 10, p. 614.
22) France et al. v. Goring et al. (1948) 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (IMT) 203, p. 462.
23) G. Acquaviva, ‘At the Origins of Crimes against Humanity: Clues to a Proper Understanding 
of the “Nullum Crimen” Principle in the Nuremberg Judgment’, 9:4 JICJ (2011) p. 890.
24) H. Kelsen, ‘Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International 
Law?’, 1:1 International Law Quarterly (1947) p. 108.
25) A. Cassese (ed.), International Criminal Law (Oxford, 2003) p. 72; M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), 
Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, 2nd edition (1999) p. 169.
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following a proposal of the Luxembourg delegate.26 The literature is rife with 
examples of studies confirming that such provision, as an exception to Article 7(1), 
has as its goal removing very serious acts from the scope of applicability of the 
nullum crimen sine lege principle.27 In other words, the Convention system of pro-
tection allows domestic authorities to punish retrospectively individuals who 
have committed acts which although not criminalised by any law are unaccepta-
ble under the general principles of law recognised by civilised countries.28
By contrast, it has been concluded elsewhere that paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 
7 set out a single unified rule, in which the Nuremberg clause is complementary to 
the non-retroactivity principle.29 It follows that whereas the concept of interna-
tional law established in the first paragraph entails treaty or customary law, Article 
7(2) refers to the “general principles of law recognized by the whole international 
community”.30 In other words, the purpose of Article 7(2) is to extend the number 
of sources, by ensuring that an act which is not criminalised under either treaty or 
customary law may be still punishable pursuant to these general principles of law.
This interpretative approach does not seem extremely persuasive. If the pur-
pose of both paragraphs is the same, it is difficult to understand why general prin-
ciples of law should not fall within the meaning of international law pursuant to 
Article 7(1). This interpretation entails, thus, the risk of depriving Article 7(2) of a 
meaningful content, considering that the first paragraph explicitly mentions 
‘international law’, which includes also the general principles of law pursuant to 
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).31
An inclination for the derogatory nature of the Nuremberg clause stems both 
explicitly and implicitly from the Court’s jurisprudence. Indeed, in the Kononov 
case, the European judges held that Article 7(2) “constitutes an exceptional dero-
gation from the general principle laid down in the first”.32 In addition, as the next 
26) J. Pradel and G. Cortens, Droit pénal européen (Dalloz, Paris, 1999) p. 321.
27) D. Gomien, D. Harris and L. Zwaak (eds.), Law and practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the European Social Charter (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 
1996) p. 206; ibid., p. 321; P. Rolland, ‘Article 7’, in L. E. Pettiti, E. Decaux and P.-H.Imbert (eds.), 
La Convention Europeenne des Droits de I’Homme (comments article by article) (Economica, 
Paris, 1995) p. 299; P. Van Dijk and G. J. H. Van Hoof (eds.), Theory and Practice Theory and 
Practice of European Convention on Human Rights (The Hague, 1990) p. 486; J. Velu and 
R. Ergec (eds.), La Convention Européenne des droits de l’homme, (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1990) 
p. 517.
28) F. Francioni, ‘Crimini internazionali’, in Digesto - Discipline pubblicistiche, IV (UTET, Torino, 
1989).
29) A. Cassese, ‘Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes against Humanity and Non-Retroactivity 
of Criminal Law: the Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia Case before the ECHR’, 4:2 JICJ (2006) p. 415.
30) Ibid.
31) P. De Sena, Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e repressione di crimini contro 
l’umanità: in margine al caso Touvier 81 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (1998) p. 414.
32) See Tess v. Lettonie, 12 December 2002, ECHR no. 34854/02, p. 7, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.
int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=tess&sessionid 
=98806214&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 19 April 2012; Kononov no. 1, supra note 20, para. 115.
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section will show, when the Court applies the provision in question, it does not 
hold it necessary to ascertain whether the domestic interpretation of criminal law 
is consistent with the standards of the legality principle.
The characterisation of paragraph 7(2) as an exception is also corroborated by 
the fact that Germany raised concerns related to its incompatibility with the legal-
ity principle enshrined in its Constitution. Indeed, German authorities ratified the 
Convention with a reservation to Article 7(2), holding that the clause in question 
could have been applied only if compatible with Article 103(2) of the Constitution, 
which allows the punishment of an act only if the sanction has been defined by a 
praevia law. In this regard, also the Preparatory Works to the Convention indicate 
that the second paragraph was added to prevent Article 7(1) from affecting those 
laws adopted at the end of Second World War (WWII), by Contracting Parties, to 
prosecute war criminals.33
Therefore, Article 7(2) constitutes a strong reaction to the degeneration of 
national justice systems in which acts considered as the most serious crimes under 
international law are not proscribed,34 and in some cases – such as the Nazi 
Germany – are even supported by state authorities. It follows that the Nuremberg 
clause allows deviations from the standards of the legality principle in relation to 
those domestic justice systems in evident contrast to the moral values underlying 
the jus gentium.35
In this regard, Article 7(2) mirrors the weak status of the legality principle 
immediately after the end of WWII, when it was not recognised yet as an interna-
tional law-based human right. Moreover, at the time of Nuremberg, the retroactive 
application of criminal law in relation to acts considered immoral by the commu-
nity of nations was generally acknowledged.36 The porous nature of the legality 
principle open to exceptions and derogations was also confirmed by Kelsen:
Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established indi-
vidual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable, and the per-
sons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, the 
retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely incompat-
ible with justice. Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of the fact that 
under positive law they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts made 
punishable with retroactive force. In case two postulates of justice are in conflict with 
each other, the higher one prevails; and to punish those who were morally responsible for 
the international crime of the Second World War may certainly be considered as more 
important than to comply with the rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, open to 
so many exceptions.37
33) See the Report of the Committee of Experts, CM/WP I (50) 15 (16/03/1950): TP iii, 485.
34) A. Bernardi, ‘Nessuna pena senza legge (Art. 7 CEDU )’, in S. Bartole, B.Conforti abd 
G. Raimondi (eds.), Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e 
delle libertà fondamentali (CedamPadova, 2001) p. 298.
35) H. Kelsen, ‘Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular 
Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals’, 31:5 California law review (1943) p. 544.
36) See Cassese, supra note 25, p. 72; Bassiouni, supra note 25, p. 108.
37) Kelsen, supra note 24, p. 165.
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Hence, in the aftermath of WWII, Article 7(2) provided the possibility to excuse 
the retroactive criminal liability for acts considered so abhorrent by the commu-
nity of nations that it would contravene a higher notion of justice not to punish 
those responsible for such atrocities.
3. The ‘Nuremberg Clause’ in Strasbourg Jurisprudence: A General Overview
The Court has confronted few cases in its jurisprudence regarding the alleged vio-
lation of the legality principle claimed by applicants convicted of international 
crimes. Until 2008, both the Commission and the Court have systematically 
applied the Nuremberg clause to war crimes, treason and collaboration with the 
enemy, and crimes against humanity.38 In this regard, all applications were 
declared inadmissible, since the crimes in question were punishable pursuant to 
the general principles of law recognised by the civilised nations.
All these cases share similar apodictical reasoning: the Commission and the 
Court noted that the applicants had not been convicted of ordinary crimes, but of 
international crimes falling within the scope of article 7(2).39 In explaining why 
these crimes were covered by the Nuremberg clause, the European Court relied on 
the Preparatory Works, providing that
the purpose of paragraph 2 of article 7 is to specify that this Article does not affect laws 
which, in the wholly exceptional circumstances at the end of the Second World War, were 
passed in order to punish war crimes, treason and collaboration with the enemy and does 
not in any way aim to pass legal or moral judgment on those laws.40
In the famous Touvier case, for the first time, the Court pointed out that this rea-
soning is also applicable to crimes against humanity.41 In particular, the applicant 
who had served as the intelligence chief of a pro-Nazi militia active in France dur-
ing the final year of the Nazi occupation had been convicted by a French court of 
aiding and abetting Nazi forces in committing crimes against humanity in 1995. 
The Court rejected the complaint as manifestly ill-founded, by holding that such 
38) With regard to war crimes, see B. v. Belgium, 10 July 1957, European Commission of Human 
Rights (Commission); X. v. Norway, 30 May 1961, Commission. In relation to crimes against 
humanity, see Touvier v. France, 13 January 1997, Commission no. 29420/95, <http://cmiskp.echr 
.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=touvier 
&sessionid=98806214&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 10 May 2012; Papon v. France (no. 2), 
15 November 2001, ECHR no. 54210/00, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item 
=3&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=papon&sessionid=98811241&skin=hudoc-en>, last 
visited 30 May 2012; Kolk and Kislyiy, supra note 1; Penart, supra note 1. Finally, with respect to 
acts of treason and collaboration with the enemy, see De Becker v. Belgium, 27 March 1962, 
Commission no. 214/56.
39) Ibid.
40) See inter alia Touvier, supra note 38, p. 14.
41) Ibid.
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crimes fell within the scope of applicability of Article 7(2).42 In so doing, the Court 
referred to the Preparatory Works, although the text only explicitly mentions war 
crimes and treason and collaboration with the enemy.
With regard to the scope of Article 7(2), a minority doctrine, on the basis of the 
Preparatory Works, endorse a narrow interpretation, by confining the applicabil-
ity of this provision to crimes committed during WWII only.43 By contrast, it has 
been argued that such an interpretation fails to consider the Preparatory Works as 
the supplementary means of interpretation applicable only when the meaning of 
a treaty is ambiguous or obscure, in line with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.44 Since no limitation ratione temporis or ratione personae 
is made in Article 7(2), the view that general principles might be applied also to 
events and individuals not related to WWII is widely supported.45
In conformity with the latter approach, the Court applied Article 7(2) even to 
acts not linked to the atrocities committed by Nazi forces, finding that “the respon-
sibility for crimes against humanity cannot be limited only to the nationals of cer-
tain countries and solely to acts committed within the specific time frame of the 
Second World War”.46 This is true, for instance, in relation to the two cases against 
Estonia.47 In 2003, Mr. Penart had been convicted of crimes against humanity 
committed in 1953, when he served as the head of Elva Department of the Ministry 
of the Interior of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, for having organised the 
killing of three civilians under the aegis of the fight against banditry.
Similarly, in 2004 Mr. Kolk and Mr. Kislyiy had been convicted of the same 
crimes, having participated in the deportation of members of the civilian popula-
tion from Estonia to remote areas of the USSR in March 1949. All the applicants 
had been convicted by Estonian courts on the basis of Articles 61(1) and 5(4) of the 
Penal Code, which entered into force respectively on 9 November 1994 and on 
1 September 2002.48 According to the Court, these crimes are universally punish-
able on the basis of the London Charter and the Resolution No. 95 of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations Organization (11 December 1946) and later by the 
International Law Commission.49 In addition, the Court held that such crimes are 
not subject to statutory limitations and therefore are punishable irrespective of 
the date of their commission, and whether committed in time of war or in time of 
peace.50
42) Ibid.
43) See Velu and Ergec supra note 27, p. 517.
44) Rolland, supra note 27, p. 300.
45) See inter alia Van Dijk and Van Hoof, supra note 27, p. 487.
46) See Penart, supra note 1, p. 9.
47) Ibid.; Kolk and Kislyiy, supra note 1; see also Naletilic v. Croatia, 4 May 2000, ECHR no. 
51891/99, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html 
&highlight=naletilic&sessionid=98811241&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 5 June 2012.
48) See Penart, supra note 1, p. 4; Kolk and Kislyiy, supra note 1, p. 4.
49) Ibid., p. 9.
50) Ibid., p. 10.
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With regard to the applicants’ submissions, challenging the correct qualifica-
tion of the crimes provided by domestic authorities, the Court pointed out that 
the interpretation of criminal law still belongs to domestic courts51 and “it is not 
its function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national 
court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms pro-
tected by the Convention”.52 Indeed, the applicants had contested both the status 
of civilians attributed to the victims and the nexus of their conducts with an armed 
conflict, as required by Article 6(c) of the London Charter. However, the Court, on 
the basis of its limited role, denied that it fell within her competence to critically 
assess the classification of the applicants’ conducts as international crimes.
4. The Twilight of Legal Certainty: Assessing the Impact of the ‘Nuremberg 
Clause’ on Individual Guarantees
In all cases concerning the application of Article 7(2), the Strasbourg Court has 
not deemed it opportune to clarify the link between the two paragraphs of Article 
7, and to shed light on the uncertain relationship between the legality principle 
and international crimes in the Convention system. Similarly, the Court declined 
to provide any elucidation of the notion of general principles of law, despite the 
necessity of such a clarification, considering the vagueness of such a concept. As 
held by Degan,
no other source of international law raises so many doctrinal controversies as the general 
principles of law ‘recognized by civilized nations’ … Writers disagree on the substance and 
content of general principles of law, as well as on their legal scope and relationship with 
other main sources, namely treaties and customary law.53
Brownlie pointed to the unsuitability of a rigid categorisation of the general prin-
ciples of law, defined as “primarily abstractions from a mass of rules and have been 
so long and so generally accepted as to be no longer directly connected with state 
practice”.54 According to some scholars, general principles of law constitute an 
affirmation of natural law concepts, which are deemed to underpin the system of 
international law.55 By contrast, some argue that these sources are part of treaty 
and customary law, as they do not add anything new to international law.56 In this 
regard, the ‘general principles of law’ are interpreted as a reiteration of the 
51) Ibid., p. 9.
52) See Touvier, supra note 38, p. 15.
53) V. D. Degan, Sources of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) p. 14.
54) I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edition (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1998), p. 18.
55) See inter alia H. Waldock, General Course on Principles of Public International Law (Hague 
Academy of International Law, 1962), p. 54.
56) G. I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Harvard University Press, 1972) ch. 7.
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fundamental precepts of international law which have already been enshrined in 
treaty and customary law.57
Article 7(2) raises further interpretative problems, since the specific content of 
general principles, lying at the intersection of natural law and positive law,58 con-
tinues to remain uncertain in international law. According to Lombois, for exam-
ple, the general principles of law under Article 7(2) reflect a sort of morale 
international,59 which can be applied to fill the gaps of normative lacunae both in 
national and international law. Deciphering the contours and the substance of the 
general principles of law would be beyond the frontiers of a article whose aim is to 
assess, from a criminal law standpoint, the impact of the derogation to the legality 
principle on individual guarantees. However, it is here worth noting the difficulty 
in establishing with accuracy the meaning of Article 7(2), and therefore in draw-
ing a clear borderline between the two paragraphs of Article 7, in order to define 
both the scope of applicability of the legality principle and its exception.
According to the reasoning provided by the European judges, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and treason and collaboration with the enemy fall within 
the scope of Article 7(2).60 In reaching this conclusion it does not assume any 
relevance whether at the material time the applicants’ conduct constituted the 
crimes in question or the same claimants could foresee the criminal consequences 
of their acts.
With regard to the objective elements of the crimes, the European judges 
accepted the formal qualification offered by domestic courts of the applicants’ 
conduct as international crimes. For instance, in Touvier, the Court did not con-
sider it necessary to find whether the offence with which the applicant had been 
charged could at the time it was committed be classified as a crime against human-
ity.61 In the Estonian cases, the Court, relying on the formal classification of crimes 
provided by domestic authorities, merely noted that the acts committed by the 
applicants were included among those forms of conduct constituting crimes against 
humanity pursuant to Article 6(c) of the London Charter.62 This definition, beyond 
the specific conduct, also provides that the act is committed against civilians and 
in time of war (war nexus).63 The contextual element of the war nexus is funda-
mental, pursuant to the London Charter, to distinguish between crimes against 
57) Ibid.
58) Bernardi, supra note 34, p. 298.
59) C. Lombois, Droit pénal international (Dalloz, 1979) pp. 130–131.
60) See all the cases mentioned supra note 38.
61) See Touvier, supra note 38, p. 14.
62) See Penart, supra note 1, p. 9; Kolk and Kislyiy, supra note 1, p. 9.
63) See Article 6(c) of the London Charter: “Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated” (emphasis added).
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humanity and ordinary crimes.64 Indeed, it is only when conduct takes place in 
connection with war crimes or crimes against peace, pursuant to Article 6(c), that 
it constitutes an offence against the values supporting the establishment of the 
Nuremberg IMT.65
In addition, these cases show that pursuant to Article 7(2) it was irrelevant to 
ascertain whether or not the applicant knew that his act was criminalised. In 
other words, the standards of the nullum crimen sine lege, and the guarantees they 
seek to ensure, did not find any fulfilment when a domestic court convicted an 
individual of war crimes, treason and collaboration with the enemy, and crimes 
against humanity.
The requirements of the nullum crimen sine lege, developed and applied by 
the  Court to ordinary crimes, provide, inter alia, that offences must be clearly 
formulated in order to protect individuals from arbitrary exercise of the state’s 
jus puniendi.66 Criminal law, as sufficiently accessible and foreseeable, allows a 
person to know which behaviour is criminal.67 In the light of Article 7(2), how-
ever,  these standards were not taken into account by the Court to assess the 
compatibility of domestic convictions with the safeguards of the legality princi-
ple as enshrined in Article 7(1). This means that the Court admitted the possibil-
ity that domestic convictions did not breach Article 7, even if the law proscribing  
the crimes in question was not accessible, and the applicants could not effec-
tively foresee, at the material time, the criminal conviction they would potentially 
incur.
For instance, in the cases against Estonia, although the acts committed by the 
applicants could have been regarded as lawful under the Soviet law at the material 
time, and the definition of crimes against humanity was introduced in the domes-
tic justice system 41 years after the events in question, the Court held that there 
was no violation of the non-retroactivity principle.68 Indeed, the Court argued 
these crimes were contrary to the general principles of laws recognised by the civi-
lised nations. In particular, referring to the events in the Kolk and Kislyiy case, 
Cassese pointed out that:
There surely did not exist a ‘general principle of law recognized by civilized nations’ pro-
hibiting crimes against humanity … in 1949 the proscription of crimes against humanity 
manifestly did not amount to a general principle of law, let alone to a rule laid down in the 
legislation of most countries of the world.69
64) See Cassese, supra note 29, p. 413.
65) Ibid.
66) See inter alia S.W. v. United Kingdom, 22 November 1995, ECHR no. 20166/92, <http:// 
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=s.w. 
&sessionid=98811241&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 11 April 2012, para. 34.
67) Ibid., para. 35.
68) See Penart, supra note 1; Kolk and Kislyiy, supra note 1.
69) Cassese, supra note 29, p. 415.
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In the light of the foregoing, it can be argued that the application of Article 7(2) 
jeopardises individual guarantees, because of the lack of any determination of 
the compatibility of domestic convictions with the requirements of the legality 
principle. Moreover, considering the non-derogatory nature of the legality princi-
ple pursuant to Article 15(2) of the Convention,70 the role of the Court and the 
Commission, confined to a mere ‘ratification’ of the formal classification of crimes 
provided by domestic authorities, appears even more objectionable.
The Court seems to renounce its role of guardian of the fundamental individual 
safeguards established by the Convention. While domestic courts are competent 
to provide interpretation of criminal law, it still falls within the Court’s sphere of 
responsibility to determine whether such an interpretation is consistent with the 
Convention. However, the approach followed by the Strasbourg jurisprudence in 
relation to international crimes entails the concrete risk that in balancing between 
substantive justice and individual liberties a system characterised by a ‘crisis of 
guarantees’ is established71 – a system in which, in other words, the knowledge of 
the individual that his conduct was criminal at the relevant time is not accorded 
any relevance.
5. The Extension of the Legality Principle over Crimes against Humanity and 
War Crimes: The Korbely and Kononov Cases
In the Korbely and Kononov cases, for the first time the Court applied the legality 
principle to crimes against humanity and war crimes, respectively.72 This marked 
a significant change from the earlier position taken by the Court. Indeed, in both 
cases, the Strasbourg judges assessed whether, at the time of their commission, 
there was in international law a clear legal basis which could be taken into account 
for the applicant’s conviction.73 Such a paradigm shift entails that even in cases of 
international crimes Article 7 has to provide “effective safeguards against arbitrary 
prosecution, conviction and punishment”.74 In order to achieve this purpose, the 
Court has made plain that the principle of legality is not confined to the non-ret-
roactivity of criminal law (lex previa), but it also prohibits the analogical interpre-
tation in malam partem of criminal law (lex stricta),75 and requires that the offence 
is clearly defined in the law (lex certa).76
70) Article 15(2), indeed, provides that “[n]o derogation from Article 2, except in respect of 
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made 
under this provision”.
71) This definition is provided by Caianiello and Fronza, supra note 9, p. 308.
72) See Kononov no. 1, supra note 20; Korbely, supra note 3.
73) Ibid., para. 116; ibid., para. 70.
74) Ibid., para. 113; ibid.
75) Ibid,. 114 (a); ibid.
76) Ibid., 114 (b); ibid.
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The non-retroactivity principle, according to the Court, binds both legislatures 
and judicial decision-making.77 Indeed, while the former may not enact criminal 
norms with retrospective effects, the latter may clarify the content of criminal 
norms and adapt them to changing circumstances.78 However, criminal courts 
are prevented from “modifying the case law through an interpretation which ren-
ders the criminal law applicable to an act which previously had never been 
punishable”.79
Thus, on the basis of Article 7(1), the Court ascertained whether the offences 
were defined by law with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability to enable the 
applicants to know at the time of the events which acts and omissions would have 
made them criminally liable for such crimes and regulated their conduct accord-
ingly.80 Pursuant to these requirements, an individual “must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case”,81 and must be able to reasonably foresee what the consequences of his 
acts or omissions will be.82
On the one hand, foreseeability imposes upon the legislature the duty to define 
with reasonable precision the prohibited acts and the related sanctions. On the 
other hand, domestic courts must guarantee a reasonable interpretation of the 
law, consistent with the essence of the offence, without, for instance, applying the 
criminal norm analogically.83
Hence, the European Court attempts to ensure judicial protection by assessing 
the material elements of criminal law, such as formulation and application, rather 
than whether sources are written or not. In this context, the protective role of the 
legality principle should be ensured through the assessment of the accessibility of 
relevant criminal law and the foreseeability of criminal sanctions. By providing 
further content to the non-retroactivity principle, such standards are developed 
by the Court to guarantee legal certainty, which could be affected by the existence 
of a pluralism of normative sources (either written or unwritten) contributing to 
the definition of prohibited acts.84
Following this reasoning, in Korbely the Grand Chamber found that the 
claimant’s conviction amounted to a violation of Article 7 since he could not 
77) Bernardi, supra note 34, pp. 261–267.
78) Ibid.
79) Ibid.
80) See Korbely, supra note 3, para. 70; Kononov no. 1, supra note 20, para. 114(b).
81) See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 26 April 1979, ECHR no. 6538/74, para. 49, <http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight 
=sunday%20%7C%20times&sessionid=98821363&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 23 February 
2012.
82) Ibid.
83) See Kononov no. 1, supra note 20, para. 114(a).
84) Ibid.
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predict that his act constituted crimes against humanity at the time of their 
commission.85
The domestic proceedings concerned the applicant’s conduct that took place 
during the Hungarian revolution of 1956, when under martial law as a military 
officer he ordered his soldiers to shoot armed rebels who had occupied the police 
station of Tata. It was only in 1993 that the Hungarian Parliament provided the 
possibility to try crimes committed in the past, issuing the Act, which, on the basis 
of the 1968 United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, established, inter alia, 
that certain acts committed during the 1956 uprising were not subject to statutory 
limitation.86 The conformity of the Act with the Constitution was confirmed, a 
few months later, by the Constitutional Court with regard to crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.87
Following the Constitutional Court’s decision, Mr. Korbely was held responsible 
for crimes against humanity on the basis of Article 3(1) of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949. However, the European Court held that such a conviction 
breached the non-retroactivity principle, as the applicant’s conduct did not 
amount to crimes against humanity. The Court’s conclusion lies in the fact that the 
rebels, who did not show any intention to surrender, did not fall within any of the 
categories of non-combatants protected under common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Convention. Five judges sitting in the Grand Chamber dissented by pointing out 
that the majority’s approach exceeded the Court’s competence, as it substituted 
“their own findings of fact for those of the Hungarian judicial authorities”, particu-
larly in relation to the conducts of the armed rebels.88 According to the dissenting 
opinion, the majority’s conclusion was based on a reconstruction of the victims’ 
actions differing from the facts presented by domestic courts, which were in a bet-
ter position to assess all the available evidence.89
With regard to the Kononov case, the Grand Chamber concluded that the appli-
cant’s conviction for war crimes, in 2004, pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Latvian 
Criminal Code, which entered into force in 1993, did not breach Article 7 of the 
Convention.90 This provision, enacted 49 years after the events concerned, pro-
vides a definition of war crimes through a renvoi to ‘relevant legal conventions’ of 
international law.91
85) See Korbely, supra note 3, para. 95.
86) Proclaimed in Hungary by Law-Decree no. 1 of 1971.
87) See supra note 5.
88) See the attached Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Lorenzen, Tulkens, Zagrebelsky, Fura-
Sandstrom and Popovic.
89) Ibid.
90) See Kononov no. 2, supra note 2, para. 244.
91) According to such provision, “[a]ny person found guilty of a war crime as defined in the 
relevant legal conventions, that is to say violations of the laws and customs of war through 
murder, torture, pillaging from the civil population in an occupied territory or from hostages or 
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Mr. Kononov, as member of the Soviet red partisans, had taken part in 1944 in a 
punitive military expedition in the village of Mazie Batie against some inhabit-
ants, suspected of being collaborators of the Wehrmacht.92 The group of red par-
tisans led by Mr. Kononov found German weapons and munitions in the houses of 
the suspects. In the course of the operation, nine people were killed, six men and 
three women.93 The Court rejected that domestic authorities had violated Article 
7 since at the time of the events war crimes for which the applicant was convicted 
were defined with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability predominantly by the 
Hague Convention of 1907.94
6. Transcending the Nuremberg Clause? Synergy between Human Rights Law 
and International Criminal Justice
The extension of the legality principle to crimes against humanity and war crimes 
shows an evolution in the Court’s jurisprudence, willing to restore a balance 
between individual guarantees and most serious crimes. If it is true that the Court 
did not clearly articulate the rationale for the departure from its previous case law, 
the determination of the existence – at the time of the events – of a clear legal 
basis for the applicants’ convictions is now considered as an essential component 
of the fundamental rights of every person. In other words, the application of 
the requirements of the legality principle to international crimes constitutes an 
evolutionary approach, necessary to render Convention rights practical and 
effective.
Thus, the Court acknowledged that the guarantees enshrined in the legality 
principle prevail over the contingent reasons which, in 1950, justified the estab-
lishment of the Nuremberg clause, whose scope is explicitly limited in Kononov, to 
the exceptional circumstances, which occurred after the end of the WWII.95 Such 
an interpretation seems to be more consistent with Article 15(2) of the Convention, 
which prohibits any derogation from the legality principle in time of war or public 
emergency.
Article 7(2) reflected the status of the nullum crimen sine lege in international 
law immediately after the end of the WWII, when, as postulated by the IMT, this 
prisoners of war, the deportation of such people or their subjection to forced labour, or the 
unjustified destruction of towns and installations, shall be liable to life imprisonment or to 
imprisonment for between three and fifteen years.”
92) See Kononov no. 2, supra note 2, para. 14.
93) Ibid., paras. 17–20.
94) The European Court relies on the Hague Convention 1907 with regard to three specific con-
ducts of the applicant, whereas, in relation to a further act, it uses the Lieber Code of 1863; see 
Kononov no. 2, supra note 2, paras. 216–219.
95) See Kononov no. 1, supra note 20, para. 115(b).
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principle was not deemed as a limitation of sovereignty.96 In particular, the non-
retroactivity of criminal law did not constitute an international law-based human 
right that could be asserted by an individual against domestic or international 
authorities.97 At this period, the reference to natural laws was considered neces-
sary to avoid the impunity of the major war criminals, due to the primitive state of 
positivisation of international criminal law.98
Whilst immediately after the end of the WWII the legality principle was not 
recognised in international law, at present “the prohibition of retroactive penal 
measures is a fundamental principle of criminal justice, and a customary, even 
peremptory, norm of international law that must in all circumstances be observed 
by national and international tribunals”.99 Thus, asserting that the legality princi-
ple does not apply as a rule of international law is no longer correct. In this respect, 
Gallant has stated that since Nuremberg the non-retroactivity principle has gained 
substantial acceptance in national constitutions, international treaties and other 
legal documents.100
Therefore, if it could be argued that at the time of Nuremberg the use of anal-
ogy was seemingly not forbidden in international law101 since then the possibility 
for judges to create crimes by analogy has been prohibited by the Rome Statute 
(Statute) of the International Criminal Court (ICC),102 other current treaties103 
and customary international human rights law.104
Thus, despite the difficulties encountered by the nullum crimen sine lege in 
international criminal law, because of the different standards and application in 
domestic criminal justice systems, this principle has gained significant relevance 
for the purpose of ensuring legal certainty even in relation to the most serious 
crimes concerning the international community as a whole. This is testified to by 
the experience of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and particularly the 
Rome Statute.
  96) See IMT, supra note 22.
  97) See K. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) p. 67.
  98) See Cassese, supra note 25; Bassiouni, supra note 25.
  99) T. Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age (Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 244.
100) Gallant, supra note 97.
101) See Bassiouni, supra note 25.
102) Article 22(2).
103) The legality principle – as an essential component of fundamental rights of every 
person – is recognised by a large number of normative texts in the protection of human rights 
field, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the Inter-American Convention for Human Rights and the European 
Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Charter of Fundamental Rights of EU, Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, African 
Charter of Human and People’s Rights.
104) Gallant, supra note 97, chapter VII.
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It is indeed worth underlining that ad hoc tribunals had already found that in 
order to establish criminal responsibility it is not sufficient to merely state that the 
individual actions were illegal under international law.105 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) Appeals Chamber (AC), for 
example, required that offences must be defined with:
Sufficient clarity under international law for its general nature, its criminal character and 
its approximate gravity to have been sufficiently foreseeable and accessible … the require-
ment of sufficient clarity of the definition of a criminal offence is in fact part of the nullum 
crimen sine lege requirement, and it must be assessed in that context.106
Therefore, it applied to crimes falling within the ICTY’s Statute those qualitative 
standards of the legality principle, such as accessibility and foreseeability, devel-
oped by Strasbourg judges in relation to ordinary crimes.
In addition, the AC of the ICTY pointed out the necessity of applying the stand-
ards of the legality principle to any form of criminal liability.107 This means that 
criminal liability must have a legal basis traceable in the Statute and in customary 
law, but also that the law establishing such responsibility must be accessible at the 
time at which acts are committed, and the individual must be able to foresee 
whether he could be held criminally liable for his action.
Beyond the ad hoc tribunals, the increasing weight assumed by the legality 
principle in international criminal law is testified to by the Rome Statute, which is 
the first statute of an international criminal tribunal explicitly establishing that 
“a person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute, unless the con-
duct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the juris-
diction of the Court”.108 Together with the non-retroactivity principle, which is 
applied also to acts committed prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 
1 July 2002,109 this instrument provides that the definition of a crime must be 
strictly construed so that ICC’s judges are clearly prevented from analogically 
applying criminal norms.110 In addition, according to Article 24, in the event of a 
change of a law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgment, the law which 
105) See Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, 29 November 2002, Trial Chamber, <http://www.icty 
.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/tjug/en/vas021129.pdf>, last visited 19 May 2012, paras. 199–201.
106) Ibid.
107) See Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, and Dragoljub Ojdanic, 21 May 2003, 
Appeals Chamber, para. 21.
108) See Article 22 of the Rome Statute (Statute).
109) See Article 24(1) of the Statute: “No person shall be criminally responsible under this 
Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.”
110) See Article 22(2) of the Statute: “The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and 
shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in 
favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”
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is more lenient to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall 
apply.111
On the basis of these provisions, the Statute recognises that the most serious 
crimes of concern for the whole international community cannot be punished 
irrespective of legal certainty. This is an essential component of the fundamental 
rights of any person. In this regard, it could be objected that Article 21(1)(c) of the 
Statute encompasses within the applicable law the “general principles of law 
derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as 
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime”.112
However, it is possible to establish a clear distinction between Article 21(1)(c) 
and Article 7(2) of the European Convention since a contextual interpretation of 
Article 21(1)(c) in the light of the various corollaries of the legality principles as 
specified in the Statute excludes that this provision may constitute a derogation 
from the legality principle as such. Admitting the existence of such derogation 
would indeed deprive of any meaningful content the strict standards of the legal-
ity principle provided by the Statute. Particularly, it would be difficult to argue that 
ICC judges may deviate from individual guarantees when the Statute explicitly 
imposes them to strictly define crimes and not to apply analogically criminal 
norms. Therefore, the sources listed in Article 21 cannot be applied irrespective 
of the individual guarantees under the legality principle, whose central role is 
confirmed by the different modalities in which this principle has been articu-
lated,113 and by the way in which the ICC strives to define as precisely as possible 
the conduct that may constitute international crimes.114
In regard to the Strasbourg Court, it cannot be excluded that the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals, and the ICC’s Statute, in particular, have implicitly 
influenced the extension of the legality principle over international crimes in 
both  Korbely and Kononov. Indeed, the various sectors of international law are, 
at  present, closely intertwined, thereby giving rise to a phenomenon that 
Cassese authoritatively defined “gradual interpenetration and cross-fertilization 
of previously somewhat compartmentalized areas of international law”.115 
111) See Article 24(2) of the Statute: “In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given 
case prior to a final judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, pros-
ecuted or convicted shall apply.”
112) See Article 21(1)(c) of the Statute: “The Court shall apply … general principles of law derived 
by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the 
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that 
those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and interna-
tionally recognized norms and standards.”
113) See Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the Statute.
114) See H. Olasolo, ‘A Note on the Evolution of the Principle of Legality in International 
Criminal Law’, 18 Criminal Law Forum (2007) p. 310.
115) Cassese, supra note 25.
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Therefore, international criminal law provides an excellent example of how – 
despite the structural differences between international criminal justice and 
regional courts for human rights – recently there has been an increase in the 
mutual interactions between international criminal tribunals and the Strasbourg 
Court.116
In this context, it seems that the paradigm shift in the European jurisprudence 
may be situated within a phenomenon of spontaneous and non-hierarchical 
circulation or cross-fertilisation of different legal regimes.117 By departing from the 
applicability of the derogation to the non-retroactivity principle, the European 
Court appears finally to align itself with the particular evolution characterising 
the legality principle in international criminal justice.118 In conformity with the 
international criminal tribunals, the Court acknowledges indeed the necessity to 
limit the intervention of criminal justice to those types of conduct clearly pro-
scribed by law, by accepting that the seriousness of the acts committed by a per-
son does not constitute a valid reason to deviate from fundamental guarantees.
7. The Banalisation of Sources in the Strasbourg Jurisprudence: A Criminal Law 
Perspective
The passage from the second to the first paragraph of Article 7 in the Court’s case 
law entails an enhancement of individual safeguards from the arbitrariness of 
state power. However, despite that Korbely and Kononov marked a watershed in 
the European Court’s jurisprudence, it is possible to express some concerns that 
the meaningful protection of the legality principle is in concreto limited. The real 
punctum dolens is constituted by the sources which are, according to the Court, a 
valid basis for the individuals’ conviction pursuant to the standards of the legality 
principle.
It is important to briefly remark how in criminal law sources assume a central 
relevance, especially in relation to the legality principle, since their nature and 
peculiarities have a direct impact on the knowledge that an individual has of a 
prohibited act.119 The specificity principle, which constitutes one of the main ele-
ments of the nullum crimen sine lege, requires that criminal rules are as detailed 
as possible, in order to establish clearly which conduct is prohibited.120 In other 
words, a clear legal text may provide individuals with warning as to what the law 
prohibits.
116) See inter alia Schabas, supra note 10.
117) M. Delmas-Marty, ‘Du dialogue à la montée en puissance des juges’, in Le dialogue des 
juges – Mélanges en l’honneur du président Bruno Genevois (Dalloz, Paris, 2009) p. 306.
118) See Olasolo, supra note 114, p. 310.
119) Fiandaca and Musco, supra note 6, p. 76.
120) Cassese, supra note 25, p. 70.
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Nonetheless, as testified by a consolidated jurisprudence, the Court does not 
focus on the formal nature of law, pointing out that criminal offences or penalties 
may have a legal basis in written or non-written law.121 With regard to Article 7(1), 
the Court does not clarify which sources fall within the concept of international 
law. However, it admits their direct applicability pursuant to the standards of the 
non-retroactivity principle. It means that the lack of a national law transposing 
international law into the domestic system – at the time of the commission of the 
crimes in question – does not assume relevance in light of the requirements of the 
nullum crimen. To put it more clearly, a domestic court can try or punish a behav-
iour criminalised only by international norms not transposed into domestic law 
without breaching the legality principle. The Grand Chamber of the Court, for 
instance, ascertained whether the applicants’ conducts, at the time when crimes 
were committed, constituted an offence defined with sufficient accessibility and 
foreseeability either by domestic or international law.122
The direct applicability of international law pursuant to Article 7(1) was 
stated in the Kononov case, in which the Court found out that “law for the 
definition of the offence, the domestic and international provisions form, in 
practice, a single criminal norm that is attended by the guarantees of Article 7(1) 
of the Convention”.123 Although the domestic criminal norm was adopted 
41 years after the applicant’s conduct took place, the Court excluded that crimi-
nal law was applied retroactively since international law provided – at the rele-
vant time – a clear legal basis, namely the Hague Conventions 1907.124 Therefore, 
there is no violation of the nullum crimen when an individual is convicted by a 
national court on the basis of international norms not transposed into domestic 
law.125
The issue regarding the direct applicability of international law under Article 
7(1) is still subject to debate among scholars. Whilst according to some authors 
this possibility is considered consistent with the requirements of the nullum cri-
men sine lege,126 other commentators believe that Article 7(1) requires the fulfil-
ment of the conditions imposed by domestic justice systems through a 
transposition of international law into national law.127 By contrast, a different per-
spective affirms that it must be ascertained whether in the specific constitutional 
system international law has a direct internal effect and whether the individual 
121) See inter alia Cantoni v. France, 11 November 1996, ECHR no. 17862/91, para. 29, <http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight 
=cantoni&sessionid=98821363&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 1 June 2012.
122) See Korbely, supra note 3, para. 73; Kononov no. 1, supra note 20, para. 116.
123) See Kononov no. 1, supra note 20, para. 119.
124) See Kononov no. 2, supra note 2, para. 216–219.
125) Ibid.
126) See Velu and Ergec, supra note 27, p. 514.
127) See Pradel and Corstens, supra note 26, p. 320; D. Harris, M. O’ Boyle and C. Warbrick, The 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London, 1995) p. 277.
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convicted could reasonably foresee his conduct constituted an offence under 
international law.128
Despite that Article 7 seems to admit the direct applicability of international 
sources, by using the disjunctive formula national or international law, it must be 
considered that in several cases sources of international law are drafted as obliga-
tions upon states, not taking into account the standards of the legality principle 
toward individuals. Thus, it would be required that states reformulate them con-
sistently with their own standards of legality before introducing crime proscrip-
tions in their national justice system.
The Court accepts that sources, not entailing any reference to criminal respon-
sibility or threat of criminal sanction, may fall within the meaning of international 
law under Article 7. This is true in relation to the famous Borderguards judgments, 
in which European judges held that at the time when the acts were committed 
they also constituted offences defined with sufficient accessibility and foreseea-
bility by the rules of international law on the protection of human rights.129 In so 
doing, the Strasbourg Court interpreted the concept of international law referring 
to well-defined sources of international human rights law, in particular with 
regard to the right to life and the right to movement.130
A similar legal reasoning was followed in the Kononov case, whereby the Court 
affirmed that offences at the time of their commission were defined with suffi-
cient accessibility and foreseeability mainly on the basis of a myriad of sources, 
including the Hague Convention of 1907,131 domestic laws, national and interna-
tional jurisprudence, Draft Declarations and military manuals.132 Binding and not 
binding norms, as well as enforced and not enforced law, were thus put together, 
128) See Van Dijk and Van Hoof, supra note 27, p. 486.
129) K.H.W v. Germany, 22 March 2001, ECHR no. 37201/97, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight =&sessionid=98838518&skin=hudoc 
-en>, last visited 12 April 2012; Streletz, Kessler, Krenz v. Germany, 22 March 2001, ECHR 
34044/96, 35532/87, & 44801/98, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal 
=hbkm&action=html&highlight=streletz&sessionid=98838518&skin=hudoc-en>, last visited 
12 April 2012 (Borderguards case).
130) Ibid., para. 105. For a critical assessment of such judgments, see inter alia B. Juratowitch, 
‘Retroactive Criminal Liability and International Human Rights Law’, in 75 British Year Book of 
International Law (2004); P. E. Quint, ‘The Border Guard Trials and the East German Past-Seven 
Arguments’, 48:4 The American Journal of International Law (2000); J. Arnold, N. Karsten and 
H. Kreicker, ‘The German Border Guard Cases before the European Court of Human Rights’, 11:1 
European Journal of crime, criminal law and criminal justice (2003).
131) See Kononov no. 2, supra note 2, paras. 216–219.
132) Beyond the Hague Convention, the Court referred, inter alia, to the: Geneva Law (1864–
1949), paras. 53–62; Lieber Code (1863), paras. 63–77, 207; Oxford Manual (1880), paras. 80–85; 
Draft Bruxelles Declaration (1874), paras. 79–80, 207; Report of the Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties (1919), paras. 92–93; 
Treaty of Versailles (1919), para. 94; Treaty of Sèvres (1920), para. 95; Draft Convention for the 
Protection of Civilian Populations Against New Engines of War (1938), para. 96; Convention on 
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes (1968), paras. 130–132; European 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and 
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encompassing sources preceding 1944 and sources following the material time at 
which the events took place.133 Nonetheless, the Hague Convention 1907 and the 
other sources used by the Court aim to regulate the conduct of states and do not 
entail any direct reference to individual criminal liability.
Including within the scope of Article 7(1) sources that were not drafted with the 
specific purpose of being applied directly to individuals may have a significant 
impact on legal certainty. In this regard, it cannot be denied that the Kononov case 
is distinguishable from the Borderguards on the basis of the sources applied for 
the applicant’s conviction. Indeed, the Hague Convention 1907 has been also used 
by the IMT and the ad hoc tribunals to support the punishability of some conducts 
constituting war crimes.134
Therefore, the following key question arises: to what extent can an individual 
effectively predict that his conduct entails criminal consequences on the basis of 
a law constituting an obligation only for states? In Kononov, the Court based the 
criminal liability of the applicant mainly on the Hague Convention 1907, despite 
that it had not been ratified by Latvia. The Court indeed concluded that there was 
no violation of Article 7, notwithstanding that the domestic applicable law did not 
contain any reference to the international laws and customs of war, which were 
not formally published in the USSR on the Latvian SSR.135 It can be stated that the 
usage of the sources in question may undermine the promotion of legal certainty 
sought by the prohibition of retroactivity of criminal law under Article 7. Indeed, 
by jeopardising the effective knowledge of the criminalised conducts, they render 
the legality principle less demanding and less protective of the individual.
In this regard, the Court assessed the foreseeability using subjective standards, 
namely the subjective ability for the applicant to recognise the criminal liability. 
In this reasoning, the clarity and precision of criminal law do not assume signifi-
cant relevance for the sake of guaranteeing foreseeability. Rather, the issue 
whether the applicants knew at the relevant time that they were committing a 
criminal offence is ascertained from the perspective of the same applicants in the 
light, for example, of their status as military commanders.136
War Crimes (1974), para. 133; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(1977), paras. 134–142.
133) See E. Fronza and M. Scoletta, ‘Corti regionali, crimini internazionali e legalità penale: 
spunti (e problemi) a partire dal caso Kononov, 1:1 IUS17 (2012).
134) See M. Cottier, ‘War Crimes’, in O. Triffterer (eds), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2008) p. 286.
135) See Kononov no. 2, supra note 2, para. 237.
136) Ibid., paras. 236–237, “As to whether the qualification of the impugned acts as war crimes, 
based as it was on international law exclusively, could be considered to be sufficiently accessi-
ble and foreseeable to the applicant in 1944, the Court recalls that it has previously found that 
the individual criminal responsibility of a private soldier (a border guard) was defined with 
sufficient accessibility and foreseeability by, inter alia, a requirement to comply with interna-
tional fundamental human rights instruments, which instruments did not, of themselves, give 
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The specificity principle explains why convictions and punishments relying on 
imprecise sources – which neither criminalise individual conducts, nor establish 
criminal sanctions – entail the concrete risk to lower the qualitative elements of 
the legality principle to a purely formal choice, unable to fulfil individual safe-
guards and to limit states’ sovereignty.
8. Pursuing a Human Rights Friendly Retroactive Interpretation (In Malam \ 
Partem): An Insoluble Oxymoron
The legality principle contributes to the legitimacy of a legal system since it limits 
the intervention of criminal justice to those conducts clearly proscribed by law in 
advance. The nullum crimen sine lege protects the separation of powers as it pro-
vides the direct representatives of citizens with the law-making authority.137 
Whilst the legislator has to clearly define criminal acts over which courts may 
exercise their jurisdiction, the role of the judiciary is confined to interpret and 
apply law. It does not have the power to create law by convicting persons of con-
ducts not penalised by the legislator in advance.
It is also argued that the legality principle plays a fundamental role in relation 
to the purposes of criminal law.138 Indeed, the preventive function of criminal law 
is constituted by its power to deter individuals from engaging in socially undesir-
able conducts, by influencing their decision-making. In other words, only a clear 
legal text indicating which acts are criminalised and what the consequent sanc-
tions are may provide individuals with warning as to what the law prohibits.
Even recognising the existence of a legal basis clearly proscribing the appli-
cants’ conduct at the time of their commission, the reasoning provided by the 
European Court still does not appear persuasive, particularly if assessed through 
the prism of the purposes of the legality principle. Indeed, the subjective approach 
used by the Strasbourg judges to examine the foreseeability presents the risk to 
reach conclusions that would have been unrealistic at the relevant time. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the Court proposes an interpretation of the relevant 
applicable law which appears distant from that which should have been adopted 
by the competent domestic courts at the time of the events.
It is opportune to remind that in Kononov the Court confirmed that a successor 
state may legitimately bring criminal proceedings against individuals who had 
committed crimes under a former regime, and in this regard apply and interpret 
the legal provisions in force at the time in which the acts were committed.139 
rise to individual criminal responsibility and one of which had not been ratified by the relevant 
State at the material time.”
137) See B. Broomhall, ‘Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’, in Triffterer, supra note 134, p. 716.
138) Ibid.
139) See Kononov no. 2, supra note 2, para. 241.
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However, it postulated that this interpretation must be provided “in the light of 
the principles governing a State subject to the rule of law and having regard to the 
core principles on which the Convention system is built”.140
Such an interpretation is proposed by the Court with regard to countries which 
before changing profoundly their political regime and legal system were not 
bound by the entire body of international human rights law, and in particular the 
European Convention. By interpreting the law applicable at the time of the events 
consistently with a normatively desirable human rights regime created ex post 
facto, the Court seems to provide an ideal interpretation of past law which radi-
cally diverged from the interpretation of the law in place in the legal system at the 
material time. Therefore, every time the Court recasts the past law applicable in a 
country which has then undergone a complete change in the political regime and 
legal system, it appears to “disregard the understanding of the legal system as it 
then existed, and constitutes a kind of fiction adopted in order to avoid the prob-
lems of retroactivity”.141
As a result, the Court did not take into account the whole body of relevant 
applicable law, including the existence of a defence to criminal responsibility, 
which would have occurred at the material time. Likewise, in the Borderguards, 
the Court upheld the inapplicability of the statutory defence – which specifically 
authorised state officials to use force in guarding the borders.142 This led to the 
strongly criticised conclusion that those ones responsible for running the country 
and surveillance of the borders committed criminal offences, even if they were 
acting consistently with statutory defences or state practice.143
It is worth to remind that according to Article 7(1), “[n]o one shall be guilty of 
any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a 
criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was com-
mitted”.144 The concept of criminal offence does not merely require that an act or 
omission fulfils the elements of a crime, but it also necessitates that the act or 
omission gives rise to criminal responsibility at the time of commission.145 This is 
possible only in case of absence of a valid defence.
It can be therefore stated that pursuant to Article 7(1) a proper fulfilment of 
the standards of the legality principle requires assessing also whether criminal 
140) Ibid., paras. 54–56.
141) See Quint, supra note 130, p. 557.
142) See Bordeguards case, supra note 129, para. 105. In particular, with regard to the grounds of 
justification pleaded by the applicant, the Court found that “the interpretation and application 
of domestic law are primarily matters to be assessed by the domestic courts … It is sufficient for 
the Court to satisfy itself that the result reached by the German courts was compatible with the 
Convention, and specifically with Article 7 § 1.” (para. 61).
143) Juratowitch, supra note 130, p. 349.
144) Emphasis added.
145) A. P. Simister and G. R. Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, Portland, 2007) p. 19.
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146) See Kononov no. 2, supra note 2, para. 187.
147) See Juratowitch, supra note 130.
liability would have been imposed at the time in which events occurred. In par-
ticular, this ascertainment gains significant relevance in all those cases regarding 
crimes committed in a country in which there has been a complete change in the 
political regime and legal system, such as the former Soviet Union’s member 
states.
In Kononov, the Court confirmed that its role is not to “rule on the applicant’s 
individual criminal responsibility, but to ascertain whether at the relevant time 
(i) there was a sufficiently clear legal basis and (ii) whether those offences were 
defined with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability …”.146 The crucial question 
is how realistic can be conclusions that the applicants were aware their acts con-
stituted crimes at the time of their commission, without taking into account 
whether the same conduct actions were covered by existing defences (such as 
the legitimate use of fire arms) pursuant to the applicable law in their domestic 
justice system at the relevant time.
Even recognising the limited role of the European Court, it is important that 
such assessment is performed relying as realistically as possible on the content of 
the legal rule binding the individual at the material time, including the existence 
of statutory defences. This means that it could be necessary for the Court to “delve 
into the interpretation of national law to a greater extent than usual”.147 Moreover, 
a purposive interpretation of Article 7(1) requiring that individuals behave con-
sistently with the applicable law at the material time entails the need to verify 
whether criminal liability would have been imposed as a consequence of their 
individual conducts.
8. Concluding Remarks
This study assessed the evolution of the recent jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
Court, which for the first time, in 2008, extended the standards of the legality prin-
ciple over international crimes. Departing from the application of the Nuremberg 
clause, in Kononov and Korbely, the European judges attempted to restore a bal-
ance between individual guarantees and core crimes, by assessing whether a clear 
legal basis for the applicants’ convictions existed at the relevant time.
However, although the passage from the second to the first paragraph of Article 
7 in the Court’s jurisprudence entails in abstracto a strengthening of individual 
safeguards from the arbitrariness of state power, it can be argued that the mean-
ingful protection of the legality principle may be in concreto significantly narrow. 
The reasons for such a result are two-pronged: first, the Court seems to provide an 
interpretation of past law which radically diverged from the interpretation of the 
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law in place in the legal system at the material time of the events; second, the 
international sources accepted by the Court as a valid basis for the applicants’ 
convictions – pursuant to the standards of the legality principle – were intended 
to create obligations only upon states, rather than individuals.
With regard to the first issue, it is important to review the criteria used by the 
Court for determining foreseeability. The concept of criminal offence does not 
merely require the satisfaction of the elements of a crime, but it also necessitates 
that the accused’s conduct could engage criminal responsibility at the time of 
commission. In addition, the assessment of foreseeability should be performed by 
relying, as realistically as possible, also on the existence of statutory defences.
With regard to the second issue outlined above, it is true that the legality prin-
ciple in international criminal law is more tolerant of imprecision than national 
law. Its standards and application differ from those recognised in domestic justice 
systems, especially considering that in international law a myriad of sources, 
including treaties, declarations, jurisprudence and other patterns of State practice 
and opinion juris, may contribute to the definition of crimes.
Nonetheless, the trend in international criminal justice shows that statutory 
criminal norms, in the attempt to define as precisely as possible the proscribed 
conducts, are assuming increasing relevance. This is confirmed by the Rome 
Statute, which reduces the gap existing between international criminal law and 
many national criminal systems in relation to the requirements of the legality 
principle. This instrument strives indeed to define as precisely as possible the 
conducts that may constitute international crimes, as shown by a number of sub-
stantive penal norms provided by Articles 6–8. In addition, the Elements of 
the Crimes,148 describing the crimes falling within the competence of the ICC in a 
detailed fashion, contribute to the strengthening of legal certainty.
In this respect, on the basis of the phenomenon of circulation or cross- 
fertilisation of different legal regimes, providing that international criminal law 
and human rights law should be coherently interpreted as parts of a whole, it is 
expected that the Rome Statute can constitute a crucial benchmark for a further 
evolution in the European Court’s jurisprudence.
148) See Article 9 of the Statute: “Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation 
and application of articles 6, 7 and 8. They shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Assembly of States Parties.”
